Finstuen v. Crutcher: The Tenth Circuit Delivers a Significant Victory for Same-Sex Parents with Adopted Children by Ross, Spencer B.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 85 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 8 
December 2020 
Finstuen v. Crutcher: The Tenth Circuit Delivers a Significant 
Victory for Same-Sex Parents with Adopted Children 
Spencer B. Ross 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Spencer B. Ross, Finstuen v. Crutcher: The Tenth Circuit Delivers a Significant Victory for Same-Sex 
Parents with Adopted Children , 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 685 (2008). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
FINSTUEN V. CRUTCHER: THE TENTH CIRCUIT DELIVERS A
SIGNIFICANT VICTORY FOR SAME-SEX PARENTS WITH
ADOPTED CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
Though the estimates vary, there are roughly 250,000 children being
raised by same-sex couples in the United States today.' Further, there
are children in approximately one-third of all lesbian and one-fifth of all
gay male households.2 While some of these children are biologically
related to at least one parent, many are adopted.3 However, numerous
states do not grant the rights that accompany adoptions by heterosexual
couples to both parents in a same-sex couple.4
In states where parents in a same-sex couple are not both recognized
as legal parents, the parent without legal rights is treated by the law as a
stranger to the child.5 Thus, the non-legal parent cannot make medical
decisions, sign school permission slips, and the child cannot inherit or
receive social security benefits upon the parent's death.6 In addition,
should a separation occur, the non-legal parent is not obligated to pay
child support, and may also be denied visitation or custodial rights, creat-
ing an unfair situation for both parents and, more importantly, their chil-
dren.7
Because some states allow same-sex couples to adopt, a new con-
flicts of law quagmire has emerged. If both parents are legally recog-
nized as the parents of an adopted child in one state and then travel or
move to another state, is their legal status still enforceable in the foreign
state? The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals provided an answer to this
debate in the recent case of Finstuen v. Crutcher,8 finding that adoptions
created in one state must be recognized nationwide under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Part I of this comment provides a broad look at the current laws that
affect same-sex adoptions in the nation. Part II discusses the Tenth Cir-
1. LambdaLegal.com, Adoption and Parenting, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-
work/issues/marriage-relationships-family/parenting/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
2. Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the
Parentage Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74, 74 (2006).
3. Id.
4. DENNIS CLIFFORD, FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY DoSKOw, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN
& GAY COUPLES, 79-80 (Emily Doskow, ed., 14th ed. 2007).
5. Id. at 80.
6. See id. at 79-80.
7. Rosato, supra note 2, at 76.
8. 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
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cuit Court of Appeal's decision in Finstuen. Finally, Part III examines
the true impact of Finstuen, and what the future holds for this battle.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings in every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof" 9
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was included in the Constitution to
ensure that the fifty states could operate as a unified nation.' 0 Therefore,
according to the first sentence of the Clause, judgments rendered in one
state court are enforceable in all other states, ending possible re-litigation
of the same issue in different forums." I
The Supreme Court has made it clear that judgments are treated dif-
ferently than the statutory laws of other states under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 12  With respect to recognition of another state's judg-
ments, the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates an "exacting" obligation
on states to accept the judgment of another state's court. 13 The issue may
not be re-litigated.1 4 Conversely, statutes of other states do not have to
be enforced in the forum state if the forum state has a strong public pol-
icy against recognizing the statute.' 5
The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is called
the "Effects Clause."' 16 Under this provision, Congress is able to deter-
mine what effects the judgments and statutes of one state would have in
sister states. 17 Thus, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally
requires states to recognize the judgments of other states, using the Ef-
fects Clause, Congress can pass laws to narrow the general rule that
judgments in one state are entitled to the same effect nationwide.18
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has emerged as a powerful tool for
both sides of the gay rights debate. The Defense of Marriage Act was
passed using the Effects Clause, curtailing the impact of same-sex mar-
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
10. Lisa S. Chen, Comment, Second Parent Adoptions: Are They Entitled to Full Faith and
Credit?, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 171, 179 (2005).
11. Martino v. Cottman Trans. Sys., Inc., 554 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
12. Mark Strasser, When is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presump-




16. Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and
the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 365, 393 (2005).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 393-94.
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riages nationwide. 9 Conversely, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Finstuen used the Full Faith and Credit Clause to create a powerful vic-
tory for same-sex parents and their adopted children.
20
B. The Current State of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Couples and
Adoption
Because the topic of same-sex relationships is so controversial, it is
not surprising that state laws regarding same-sex couples vary widely.
This patchwork of laws can have serious ramifications on a same-sex
couple's adoption rights.
1. Methods of Adoption for Same-Sex Couples
Currently, there are three situations where the law recognizes both
members of a same-sex couple as legal parents of a child. First, in states
that allow gays and lesbians to marry or enter into civil unions, children
born into the marriage are automatically treated as children of both par-
ents, even though one parent may not be biologically related to the
child.2' No adoption proceeding is necessary.22 In addition to parental
rights created by virtue of marriages or civil unions, at least nine states,
and the District of Columbia, currently allow same-sex couples to adopt
through a one step adoption process.2 a Through this process, a court
proceeding is required where a judge signs a final order granting the
adoption.
24
Finally, at least twenty-seven states allow same-sex second parent
adoptions in all or some circumstances. A second parent adoption is
used for non-biological or legally recognized parents to adopt their part-
ner's child.26 As in the single adoption process, second parent adoptions
also conclude with a court proceeding.27 After the court has ruled on the
19. See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
20. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152-56 (10th Cir. 2007).
21. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 80-81. Current states that allow same-sex marriage or
civil unions include Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Vermont, and New Jersey. Id. at 79-80.
22. See id.
23. BRETF MCWHORTER SEMBER, GAY & LESBIAN PARENTING CHOICES 22 (Gina Talucci,
ed., Career Press 2006). Along with the District of Columbia, the states that allow same-sex cou-
ples to adopt through a one step adoption process include Vermont, New Jersey, California, Con-
necticut, Illinois, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Massachusetts. Id.
24. Id. at 51. Of note for same-sex couples, however, is that private adoption agencies gener-
ally are allowed to use marital status and sexual orientation as reasons to deny an adoption, no matter
what a state's law is, and therefore there are still some hurdles for gay couples wishing to adopt in
these states. Id. at 36.
25. Id. at 54. For an up to date list of state cases on second-parent adoption, visit the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, www.nclrights.org.
26. SEMBER, supra note 23, at 53. Thus, in a second parent adoption situation, at least one
parent already has legal control over the child, either by virtue of being the biological parent, or
because they previously adopted the child through the single adoption process.
27. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 82, 84. This process can also involve home studies and
inspections by the adoption agency to judge the fitness of the second parent, as well as consent by
any other living biological parent. SEMBER, supra note 23, at 56-57.
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adoption, the final step often involves amending the child's birth certifi-
cate to list both parents.28
2. Limitations on the Adoption Rights of Same-Sex Couples
There are currently only a small handful of states that specifically
ban adoptions by same-sex couples. Florida is the only state that explic-
itly bans all homosexuals, either single or in a couple, from adopting.29
Mississippi bans adoptions for gay couples, and Utah restricts adoptions
to married couples only, effectively banning same-sex couples from
adopting because gays cannot marry in Utah.30 In addition, the Attorney
General of the state of Michigan announced in 2004 that "gay adoption is
against Michigan law and that, as a matter of policy, Michigan will not
recognize adoptions performed in other states.'
Also looming on the horizon are possible state constitutional
amendments aimed at banning same-sex couples from adopting.32 In
2006 alone, sixteen states considered putting such amendments on the
ballot.33 Conservative groups see this as the next logical step in the on-
going battle over gay rights.34 While none of these amendments were
actually placed on the ballot, activists in Arkansas are already preparing
a ban for the 2008 election. 35 However, these bans have not gained the
same amount of traction as the same-sex marriage bans, and even con-
servative presidential candidates such as Mitt Romney have conceded
that same-sex couples have an interest in adopting in some circum-
stances.36 Nevertheless, the drastic impact these bans could have on the
adoption rights of same-sex couples cannot be understated.
3. The Impact of DOMA
While not expressly aimed at same-sex adoptions, the Federal De-
fense of Marriage Act37 ("DOMA") has created even more problems for
28. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 85.
29. Dyana Bagby, Only One State Now Facing Gay Adoption Ban, SOUTHERN VOICE, Feb.
24, 2006, available at http://www.southernvoice.com/2006/2-24/news/national/nat 1.cfm.
30. Id.
31. Staff Editorial, Parenting Prejudice: Gay Adoption Decision Unmerited, MICH. DAILY,
Sept. 21, 2004, available at
http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper85 1/news/2004/09/21/Opinioneditorials/F
rom-The.Daily.Parenting.Prejudice-1425120.shtml. This policy will likely be susceptible to attack
using the arguments in Finstuen, however.
32. Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up in 16 States, USA TODAY, Feb. 20,
2006, at LA, available at http:www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20-gay-adoptionx.htm.
33. Id. Bills were drafted or discussed in the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
34. Id.
35. Gay Adoption Ban Proposal Submitted to Arkansas A.G., 365GAY.cOM, Aug. 24, 2007,
http://www.365gay.com/Newscon07/08/082407ark.htm.
36. Glen Johnson, Romney Seeks Gay-Adoption Exemption, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14,
2006, available at http://www.gay.com/news/article.html?2006/03/14/1.
37. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2008).
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same-sex parents. DOMA was signed into law by President Bill Clinton
on September 21, 1996.38 DOMA contains two provisions: the first part
reserves the term "marriage" exclusively for couples composed of one
man and one woman; the second, and more controversial part, gives the
option to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states.39 Congress passed DOMA using its powers under the "Effects
Clause" of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 40 allowing states to deny full
faith and credit to other state's decisions granting same-sex marriages.4'
Thus, in addition to a basic same-sex marriage ceremony, declaratory
judgments granted in one state recognizing a same-sex marriage do not
have to be recognized in other states under DOMA.42
Using this authority granted to them by section two of DOMA, at
least forty states 43 have also passed their own version of DOMA, often
called "mini-DOMAs." 44 However, not all of these mini-DOMAs are
created equal, resulting in three categories. The most lenient category is
the basic mini-DOMAs that simply define marriage as between "one man
and one woman" and refuse to recognize marriages celebrated in other
states between same-sex couples.45 The second category consists of
states that not only refuse to recognize out of state same-sex marriages,
but also refuse to recognize any other rights arising out of the marriage.46
38. Oren Goldhaber, "I Want My Mommies ": The Cry for Mini-DOMAs to Recognize the
Best Interests of the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 287, 290 (2007).
39. Id. (referring to I U.S.C.A. § 7 (2008)). Section two of DOMA states:
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or
a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2008).
40. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. While there are numerous arguments
debating whether Congress has the power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to create DOMA
under the Effects Clause, it is beyond the scope of this comment.
41. Wardle, supra note 16, at 387. It is important to recognize that DOMA allows states to
choose whether to recognize same-sex marriages in other states; it does not actually require them to
take any action one way or another. Id.
42. Id. at 388.
43. For an up-to-date list of what states have passed laws or amended their state constitutions
with mini-DOMAs, visit Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Laws, available at
http://www.hrc.org/issues/5594.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
44. Strasser, supra note 12, at 305.
45. Id. at 305-06. For example, North Carolina's DOMA states that "marriages, whether
created by common law, contracted, or performed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of
the same gender are not valid in North Carolina." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (West 2008); see
also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2008) ("It is hereby declared to be the strong and
longstanding public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one
woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or
foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.").
46. Strasser, supra note 12, at 305-06. Arkansas' DOMA, for example, refuses to recognize
any rights or obligations created by any contract arising out of the marriage, including divorce pro-
ceedings. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(b) (West 2008) (making obligations such as child support
not enforceable in Arkansas); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03(4)(b) (West 2008) ("A marriage
entered into by persons of the same sex, either under common law or statute, that is recognized by
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The third category consists of the most extreme states which not only ban
same-sex marriages, but also civil unions and any other rights that may
arise out of a legally created same-sex relationship.47
The second and third categories of mini-DOMAs can have a drastic
impact on same-sex adoptions. In these states, because contractual obli-
gations that arise out of the legally created relationship are not recog-
nized, any adoptions recognized by virtue of the marriage or legal union
may not have to be recognized in the mini-DOMA state.48 Thus, in the
states that automatically make both parents of a child born into their mar-
riage or civil union legal parents,49 the non-biological parent's rights are
stripped away because these parental rights were created as a result of the
marriage/civil union. ° In addition, any obligations created in a divorce
proceeding cannot be enforced in these states, such as child support or
visitation rights .5  For example, if one mother in a same-sex civil union
in Vermont had a daughter, Vermont would recognize the non-biological
parent as a legal parent because of the civil union. If the family subse-
quently moves to Florida, however, Florida would not have to recognize
the non-biological mother as a legal parent because the state would not
recognize the underlying civil union. Thus, DOMA and the many classi-
fications of mini-DOMAs have greatly altered the legal landscape for
same-sex parents.
On the other hand, while the legal rights of parents in marriages or
unions can be voided by mini-DOMAs, what about second-parent adop-
tions? Is this a more reliable method for same-sex couples to ensure
their parental rights will be recognized in mini-DOMA states? The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this question in Fin-
stuen v. Crutcher.
II. FINSTUEN V. CRUTCHER
A. Facts
Lucy and Jennifer Doel, two women in a relationship, resided in
Oklahoma with their adopted child E, who was born in Oklahoma.
5 2
another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by virtue of the
marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this state.").
47. Strasser, supra note 12, at 305-06. The language of Florida's statute prohibits recognition
of any same-sex marriages, as well as any "relationships between persons of the same sex which are
treated as marriages in any jurisdiction," thus negating legally created civil unions as well as mar-
riages. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1) (West 2008); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603
(West 2008) ("A public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other state, territory, possession or
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of any other state ... shall not be given effect by this state.").
48. See Goldhaber, supra note 38, at 287.
49. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 79-80 (including Massachusetts, California, Connecti-
cut, Vermont, and New Jersey).
50. See Strasser, supra note 12, at 306.
51. See id.
52. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Neither parent was the biological parent of E.53 Lucy officially adopted
E in California in January of 2002. 5 4 Six months later, through Califor-
nia's second parent adoption process, Jennifer also adopted E.55 Upon
return to Oklahoma, the Oklahoma State Department of Health
("OSDH") refused to issue a birth certificate with both Lucy and Jennifer
listed as parents, instead only naming Lucy as E's mother.5 6 Despite
repeated requests for a corrected birth certificate, OSDH refused.
5 7
Prior to the filing of the case, the Oklahoma Attorney General's Of-
fice issued an opinion stating that, under Oklahoma's current laws, the
state would have to recognize out-of-state adoptions by homosexual cou-
ples.58 While the Doels' request for an amended birth certificate was
pending, the Oklahoma state legislature amended the state's adoption
statute in response to the Attorney General's opinion, explicitly denying
recognition to out-of-state adoptions by homosexual couples. 59 The
amended statute read in full:
The courts of this state shall recognize a decree, judgment, or final
order creating the relationship of parent and child by adoption, issued
by a court or other governmental authority with appropriate jurisdic-
tion in a foreign country or in another state or territory of the United
States. The rights and obligations of the parties as to matters within
the jurisdiction of this state shall be determined as though the decree,
judgment, or final order were issued by a court of this state. Except
that, this state, any of its agencies, or any court of this state shall not
recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the same sex
from any other state orforeign jurisdiction.
60
In order to justify the denial of the revised birth certificate to the Doels,
OSDH relied on this amended statute forbidding the recognition of adop-
tions by same-sex couples.6'
The Doels, along with two other same-sex couples with adopted
children, filed suit against the State of Oklahoma in the United States





57. Id. at 1146.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7502-1.4(A) (West 2008) (emphasis added). Commentators
have interpreted the statute to be so broad and overarching that a child of a same-sex couple would
legally become an orphan if traveling through the state of Oklahoma, if neither parent was the bio-
logical parent. See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Celebrates Oklahoma Decision Not
to Appeal 10th Circuit Court Gay Parent Adoption Decision (Aug. 17, 2007),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/oklahoma-not-to-appeal.html.
61. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1146.
2008]
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enforcement of the amendment.62 The defendants in the suit were the
Governor of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Attorney General, and the Com-
missioner of OSDH. 63  The plaintiffs alleged that the amendment vio-
lated three constitutional provisions: the Full Faith and Credit Clause;
the Equal Protection Clause; and the Due Process Clause.64 After finding
that the Doels and one other couple had constitutional standing to chal-
lenge the statute, the district court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs on all three claims.65 Only the OSDH Commissioner appealed
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.66
B. Decision
67
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Oklahoma adop-
tion statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.68 The Court states, "The Constitution states that 'Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other state.' 69 The purpose behind the
Clause is to make all of the states "integral parts of a single nation"
62. Id. at 1142. Because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the other two couples
lacked constitutional standing, the facts of their claims are omitted. Id. at 1143-45.
63. Id. at 1142.
64. Id. at 1143.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Before addressing the substantive issues of the case, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether
the couples had constitutional standing to bring the case and whether it was moot. The Hampel-
Swaya family lacked standing because they did not live in Oklahoma, and the court held that the
threat of visiting the child's birth mother in Oklahoma without any scheduled visits did not give
them an injury-in-fact, especially since they already had an adoption certificate from their home state
of Washington with both fathers listed as parents. Id. at 1144. The Finstuen-Magro family also
lacked standing because they could not identify any encounters with state officials that could demon-
strate that the amended statute had caused them direct harm, and therefore also could not identify an
injury-in-fact. Id. at 1145. The Doels, however, did have standing. First, OSDH had refused to
issue a new birth certificate with both mothers listed as parents, creating an injury-in-fact. Id.
Moreover, during a medical emergency for their child, the ambulance and emergency room told
them that only "the mother" could accompany the child, further solidifying the injury-in-fact. Id.
Secondly, the court held that OSDH had directly caused this injury, and that the adoption amend-
ment was, at least in part, OSDH's justification for refusing to issue an amended birth certificate,
satisfying the causation prong of standing. Id. at 1145-46. Finally, the court recognized that invali-
dating the amendment and ordering OSDH to issue a new birth certificate would redress the injury.
Id. at 1147.
The court also found that the case was not moot. Id. at 1149-51. At the lower court level,
OSDH "conceded" that the adoption amendment would not apply to the Doels, since under the
department's interpretation of the statute, same-sex parents who adopted through a two-step process
(such as second parent adoptions) would not be impacted, because the language of the statute refers
only to single adoptions. Id. at 1149; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the single adoption process. Thus, OSDH argued that the case was moot since the de-
partment had agreed to give the Doels what they wanted. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1150. The Court
refused OSDH's interpretation of the statute, finding that the public policy behind the amendment
applied to all same-sex adoptions, and the alleged concession by OSDH to issue a new birth certifi-
cate in this particular instance did not render the case moot, especially since OSDH had yet to issue a
new birth certificate. Id. at 1149-51. In the concurrence/dissent, however, Justice Hartz seemed to
agree with OSDH's interpretation of the statute. See infra note 88.
68. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1151-56.
69. Id. at 1152 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
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where a remedy obtained in one state may be enforced in every other
state. 70 Therefore, the Court states "If in its application local policy must
at times be required to give way, such is part of the price of our federal
system.",
71
However, the court noted that the Clause treats statutes and judg-
ments of other states differently.72 Regarding foreign statutes, full faith
and credit is not always required, and occasionally a state may choose
not to enforce another state's laws if the forum state's public policy is
contrary to the policy behind the foreign state's law.73 Conversely, with
respect to judgments of other states, "it is clear there is no 'public policy'
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause., 74 Judgments made in
other states create an "exacting" obligation on all other states to recog-
nize the judgment, giving it nationwide force.
75
In the case at hand, the Tenth Circuit accordingly held that "[a]
California court made the decision, in its own state and under its own
laws, as to whether Jennifer Doel could adopt child E. That decision is
final. 76  Because Oklahoma has a statute providing for supplemental
birth certificates for adopted children, it must therefore issue the Doels'
requested amended birth certificate.77
OSDH made two counterarguments to this decision. First, it argued
"that requiring Oklahoma to recognize an out-of-state adoption judgment
would [give another] state control over the effect of its judgment in
Oklahoma. 78 For example, OSDH argued that all of the rights that are
synonymous with adoption in Oklahoma would flow to the Doels, such
as the right to inherit private property, making Oklahoma apply Califor-
nia law within its own state.79 The court responded that while a state
must recognize another state's judgment, the forum state is then free to
decide how to enforce that judgment.80 Thus, the actual adoption judg-
ment is the only California decision that Oklahoma must recognize.8'
Otherwise, the court found, Oklahoma's adoption laws govern8 2 and




73. See id. (implying that a public policy exception does apply to statutes because they are
treated differently than judgments, to which a public policy exception does not apply).
74. Id. at 1153. But see State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 662 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ohio 1996) (hold-
ing that a forum state's public policy could be used to void a foreign adoption).




78. Id. at 1153.
79. Id
80. Id. at 1153-54.
81. See id. at l154.
82. Id
2008]
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parent and child, those rights flow from an application of Oklahoma law,
not California law. 83 Because Oklahoma's adoption statutes grant in-
heritance and other rights to all adopted children, these rights would
naturally flow to the Doel family by virtue of the California adoption.
84
Second, OSDH argued that it is not bound to recognize out-of-state
judgments in which it was not a party. 85 The court swiftly disposed of
this argument, stating that "[t]he Doels do not seek to enforce their adop-
tion order against Dr. Crutcher in his official capacity;" rather, they sim-
ply want Oklahoma to recognize their out-of-state adoption as adjudi-
cated by California.86 In conclusion, the court stated:
We hold today that final adoption orders and decrees are judgments
that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Therefore, Oklahoma's adoption amendment is
unconstitutional in its refusal to recognize adoption orders of other
states that permit adoption by same-sex couples.
87
Because the court decided the issue using the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, it did not address whether the adoption amendment infringed the
Doels' due process or equal protection rights.88
III. LOOKING FORWARD
A. The Doomsday Scenario: A Narrow Reading of the Finstuen Holding
Complying with long-standing precedent, the Finstuen court held





86. Id. at 1155.
87. Id. at 1156.
88. Id. Judge Harris Hartz filed a brief concurrence/dissent, stating that the court should not
address any constitutional issues because "[t]he OSDH concedes in its brief that the statute chal-
lenged by the Doel plaintiffs does not preclude issuance of the birth certificates they seek," based on
OSDH's interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1156-57 (Hartz, J., concurring and dissenting). As a
result, according to Judge Hartz, the district court's order should have been affirmed without discus-
sion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. at 1157.
89. While not the focus of this comment, the Finstuen court did not address numerous other
legal arguments that could have been used to strike down the Oklahoma law. In addition to the
equal protection and due process arguments that the court did not address, the plaintiffs also ad-
vanced a constitutional right to travel argument that was dismissed by the district court. Appellee's
Principal Brief at 2, Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-6213).
In addition, the Parental Kidnapping and Prevention Act ("PKPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(2000), which Congress added as an addendum to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, also could be
used as an argument against the validity of the Oklahoma law. The PKPA was enacted in order to
ensure that states would respect the custody decrees of other states, creating stability for children
nationwide. Wardle, supra note 16, at 407. The heading of the PKPA, for example, states: "Full
faith and credit given to child custody determinations." § 1738A. A recent Virginia decision,
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006), held that the PKPA required
Virginia to recognize a custody decree between a same-sex couple adjudicated in Vermont, even
though Virginia's mini-DOMA would not recognize the civil union between the parties in Vermont
that created the parental rights for the non-biological parent in the couple. Id. at 337.
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requires recognition of adoption decrees nationwide. 90 However, while
the court was decisive in its reiteration that adoptions are judgments, it
may have left a window open for Oklahoma to still modify its adoption
laws for the purposes of treating same-sex adoptive parents differently:
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt
the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mecha-
nism for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel
with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures
remain subject to the even-handed control of forum law.
91
Read plainly, these sentences still allow Oklahoma to modify all of its
existing adoption laws and narrow the rights that flow from an adoption
to be given only to heterosexual couples. This case only requires Okla-
homa to re-issue a birth certificate, because a state statute allows for
adoptive parents to ask for supplementary birth certificates.92 As the
Court said, "Oklahoma continues to exercise authority over the manner
in which adoptive relationships should be enforced in Oklahoma and the
rights and obligations in Oklahoma flowing from an adoptive relation-
ship., 93 Because Oklahoma's adoption statutes do not distinguish based
on sexual orientation, these rights flow to the adoptive children.94 How-
ever, Oklahoma apparently could amend all of these statutes to explicitly
deny these rights to homosexual couples. Alternatively, the state could
amend its adoption statutes to state that the child may inherit from its
An argument using the PKPA has not been advanced yet in the context of same-sex adop-
tions. Is an adoption a "custody determination," within the meaning of the PKPA? The act defines a
"custody determination" as "a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody
of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications."
§ 1738A(b)(3). Several courts have already held that the PKPA applies to heterosexual adoption
proceedings, and the common sense interpretation of the statute implies that it covers all adoptions.
E.g., In the Matter of B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1034 (D.C. 1989); see also Robert G. Spector, The
Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's Statute Denying Recognition to Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples
From Other States, 40 TULSA L. REv. 467, 472-74 (2005). No courts have ruled that the PKPA does
not apply to adoption proceedings. Spector, supra at 474. Thus, if the plaintiffs in Finstuen had
argued for the application of the PKPA, the Oklahoma statute would have to be found unconstitu-
tional because Congress has ordered all states to recognize the adoptions adjudicated in other states.
Id.
90. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1156; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 290 (1971) ("An adoption rendered in a state having judicial jurisdiction... will usually
be given the same effect in another state as is given by the other state to a decree of adoption ren-
dered by its own courts. The status of adoption, created by the law of a state having jurisdiction to
create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of
adoption when created by its own law."). Some analysts have argued that adoptions are not "judg-
ments" for the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause because adoptions do not involve adver-
sarial proceedings. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay
Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REv. 561, 583-84 (2005). However, there is no legal authority support-
ing such a contention.
91. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1153-54 (citing Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
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adoptive "father" and/or "mother."95 This language could be interpreted
to restrict the statute to only one father or mother per child, effectively
excluding children with two mothers or fathers.9 6  The only thing that
Oklahoma cannot do, according to this case, is pass a statute explicitly
refusing to recognize adoptions of same-sex couples in foreign states.
97
Oklahoma can, however, strip these foreign adoptions of practically all
effect if it wishes to do so.
9 8
As the court pointed out, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is only
truly binding with respect to judgments.99 With regard to statutes, how-
ever, states are often allowed to use their public policy as a guide when
deciding whether to apply a foreign state's statutory laws. 100 For exam-
ple, the right to make medical decisions for an adopted child or allow an
adopted child to inherit property are based on the statutes of the state
granting the adoption.10' These rights, according to the Finstuen deci-
sion, are not at issue in the adoption proceeding. Because these rights
were not granted in any official court proceeding involving a judgment,
every other state has the power to determine whether these rights should
also be granted under its own statutory laws.
This decision is fully in line with other Full Faith and Credit Clause
interpretations. The United States Supreme Court's rulings have consis-
tently stated that states are free to choose the "time, manner, and mecha-
nisms" for enforcing other states' judgments.10 2  Inheritance rights for
adopted children, for example, have long presented a conflict of laws
question. For example, if a child is adopted in State A, which allows
adopted children to inherit property, but the child's adoptive parents have
a house in State B that does not allow adoptive children to inherit, the
law of State B will control whether the child can inherit the house. 10 3 In
95. ld
96. See Carissa R. Trast, You Can't Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex
Couples Are Entitled to Inheritance Rights from Both Their Parents, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 857, 889
(2006).
97. See Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1156.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 1152.
100. See id at 1152-53 (citing Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232-
33 (1998)).
101. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
102. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.
103. See In re Crossley's Estate, 7 A.2d. 539, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939); see also C. C. Marvel,
Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Adoption as Affecting Descent and Distribution of Decedent's
Estate, 87 A.L.R.2d 1240, § 8 (1963); RESTATEMENT, supra note 90. But see McNamara v. McNa-
mara, 135 N.E. 410, 412 (111. 922) (holding that the status, including the rights and duties between
parent and adopted child, are established by the law of the domicile); Shick v. Howe, 114 N.W. 916,
916 (Iowa 1908) (finding that the status and legal relationship between adopted child and parent is
fixed by the law of their domicile); Barrett v. Delmore, 54 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Ohio 1944) ("Generally,
the status of adoption, created by the law of a state having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the
same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its
own law."); Slattery v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 161 A. 79, 80 (Conn. 1932) (ruling that an
adopted child's ability to inherit is governed by the laws of the state of adoption).
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addition to inheritance rights, other rights not including real property,
such as the right of a parent to discipline a child in a certain manner, are
governed by the state in which the parent and child are located, not
where the adoption occurred.'0 4 The only issue that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause protects in the adoption context is preventing one party to
the suit from bringing the exact same suit in another state to try and reach
a different result (i.e., whether the adoption itself is valid).1
0 5
Under this narrow reading of the court's language in Finstuen, this
doomsday scenario for same-sex couples seems possible. However,
should Oklahoma attempt to change the statutory rights that accompany
adoptions to exclude gay couples, the state would expose itself to a wind-
fall of legal problems.
B. Can Oklahoma Really Try to Deny State Statutory Adoption Rights to
Gay Couples?
While the language of Finstuen and traditional recognitions of statu-
torily granted rights to adopted children could paint a bleak picture of the
true impact of Finstuen, Oklahoma would have an uphill battle if it spe-
cifically tried to deny statutory rights to adopted children of same-sex
couples. Using either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or Equal Protec-
tion Clause, it is clear that Finstuen is much more than a hollow victory
for gay rights supporters.
1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not allow a state to ignore the
laws of other states arbitrarily. There must be a strong public policy
against the application of foreign law before declining to apply it.1
0 6
Under a public policy analysis, would it really be in the best interests of
the child to take away its adoptive parents' parental rights?
Unlike the debate over whether to recognize same-sex marriages
and similar unions, this is a debate concerning the rights of a child, and is
therefore much more difficult to attack.10 7 Finstuen makes clear that the
actual adoption cannot be questioned, and thus there is nothing the court
can do to actually take the child away from the parents. In any case con-
cerning adopted children, the legal standard in determining custody is
what is in the "best interest of the child."'08 Without the option to liter-
ally remove the child, courts are likely to concede that the parents should
therefore at least be granted rights over the child. If the child has been
raised for multiple years by same-sex parents, it cannot be better to sud-
104. Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgment Issues in Interstate Adop-
tion Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 807 (2003).
105. See id at 805-10.
106. See Strasser, supra note 12, and accompanying text.
107. See Johnson, supra note 36, and accompanying text.
108. See Chen, supra note 10, at 194.
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denly deny those parents the right to sign a permission slip for the child
or to make medical decisions on the child's behalf. In addition, the psy-
chological damage that the child would suffer from being separated from
its parents alone would weigh against upholding any amended statutes.
Further, in an increasingly mobile age, where travel is often a necessity,
no policy should favor stripping same-sex parents of all adoptive rights
simply because they have to travel through one state to reach their even-
tual destination. This would create chaos in the legal system from state
to state, which certainly is what the authors of the Constitution were try-
ing to prevent when passing the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 09
2. Equal Protection Clause
In addition to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a court would be
much more likely to entertain an equal protection argument if Oklahoma
were suddenly to amend multiple statutes denying parental rights to
same-sex couples with adopted children.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment estab-
lishes that all persons are created equally under the law and should not be
discriminated against for arbitrary reasons. 10 In an equal protection
analysis, a court must choose a level of scrutiny to apply to the affected
class, ranging from heightened scrutiny for racial or suspect discrimina-
tion to the rational basis level of scrutiny for unprotected classes."' De-
spite strong arguments for applying a heightened standard of scrutiny to
homosexuals, the Supreme Court has consistently applied a rational basis
level of scrutiny in cases involving laws allegedly discriminating against
gays and lesbians.' 1 2 Under the rational basis test, the government must
prove that a challenged law "bears a rational relationship to some legiti-
mate end."
'"13
In Romer v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court held that an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution denying protection to
homosexuals under anti-discrimination laws was irrational, and therefore
unconstitutional, because it was "born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected."'"14 In addition, the Court held that the sole "desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest" even under the lowest level of scrutiny. 115
109. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007).
110. See CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. See, e.g., Pace Memb. Warehouse v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. 1997).
112. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1996); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). While the analyzed scenario would almost certainly
be struck down under a higher level of scrutiny, it would also lose under the rational basis level and
thus the application of the higher levels of scrutiny is beyond the scope of this article.
113. Romer, 517U.S. at631.
114. Id. at 634.
115. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Even though some question whether an equal protection argument
would have been successful in Finstuen,116 it would certainly prevail if
Oklahoma were to amend the statutory rights granted to adopted children
by denying those rights specifically to adopted children of gay couples.
Similar to Romer, statutes amended specifically to deny rights to homo-
sexuals would be based on animosity towards homosexuals. While it
could be argued that the state would do this to protect the children from
being raised in a "non-traditional" household that could damage their
development, the true impact of the law would be to rip children away
from the same-sex parents that raised them, or at least to significantly
reduce the rights they have over their children. Gay couples already
cannot adopt in Oklahoma. Therefore, arguing that the amended laws
would prevent gay adoptions in the state is a moot point. The only peo-
ple impacted by these new laws would be pre-existing same-sex families
who have since traveled or moved to Oklahoma. Voiding the parental
rights of these foreign residents would not be in the best interests of the
children nor would it be a legitimate government interest, especially con-
sidering the psychological damage that children would endure as a result.
Such blatant discrimination would almost surely fail under an Equal Pro-
tection Clause analysis.
Thus, despite the language of Finstuen, it would be difficult for
Oklahoma to deny the rights California granted to adopted children, even
though they are statutorily granted. Both the Full Faith and Credit and
Equal Protection Clauses create a strong argument protecting same-sex
families with adopted children from such a doomsday scenario. As a
result, the holding in Finstuen is a crucial victory for protecting the rights
of same-sex couples and their adopted children.
CONCLUSION
Despite the victory in Finstuen, it is clear that same-sex couples will
continue to face legal hurdles in the future, whether it be a lack of ex-
plicit legal protection or an outright ban on same-sex adoptions. The
patchwork of current laws, both for and against homosexuals, will con-
tinue to result in interstate conflicts of laws, and possibly create splits
between the circuits on how to best address the issues.
Regardless, Finstuen will be persuasive authority nationwide, and
binding in the Tenth Circuit, ensuring some protections for same-sex
couples traveling or moving into states that do not allow same-sex cou-
ples to adopt. In addition, both the Full Faith and Credit and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses provide security for gay couples who fear the possibility
that states might amend specific statutes to deny parental rights to them.
While gay rights advocates will continue to have numerous battles for
116. See Spector, supra note 88, at 468 n.4.
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the foreseeable future, it should be comforting to know that children of
gay couples are entitled to the same protection as all others.
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